to override the basic demands of beneficence? Some moral theories may claim that, while such basic demands provide us with moral reasons, agent-relative prerogatives can, and often do, outweigh them. Before this question can be considered in depth, however, it will be helpful to be as clear as possible about what is meant by a minimally decent living standard.
Given the well-documented diversity of factors that influence living standards 1 , defining what makes for a minimally decent standard of living will be a complicated affair. From the point of view of morality, what seems most important is the achievement of seemingly fundamental human needs, among them basic sustenance, basic medical care, avoidance of unreasonably premature mortality, avoidance of debilitating poverty, avoidance of slavery and servitude, freedom from disablement, etc. (I interpret the level at which one obtains a minimally decent living standard absolutely rather than relatively.
2 ) A minimally decent standard of living is thus a true minimum: such a standard is required for an agent to live and have any measure of control over his or her life; to maintain, in Sen's language, a minimal level of basic human capabilities.
Moral theories that lay claim to take the interests of others at all seriously must recognize the importance of a minimally decent standard of living as required by the basic demands of beneficence. Concern that fails the level of minimal decency is no concern at all.
Nevertheless, this conclusion, however important, is compatible with the view that agentrelative prerogatives override the basic demands of beneficence in cases of conflict. The central claim of this paper is that, even submitting to the moral importance of agent-relative prerogatives, the basic demands of beneficence always override their pursuit. Any principled denial of this claim must rely upon the idea that the loss of one's agent-relative prerogatives can, at least in certain cases, be (morally) comparable to the loss of one's minimally decent standard of living, an This case illuminates a crucial initial conclusion. There is something very important to moral reasoning captured by the basic demands of beneficence. Plausible moral systems, or at least, moral systems that have any claim to take seriously the situation of others, must allow that the basic demands of beneficence can, in at least some cases, override the pursuit of agentrelative prerogatives. Those who argue that agent-relative prerogatives can override the basic demands must proffer convincing reasons for this belief, reasons that do justice to the importance of the basic demands of beneficence. It is to this I now turn.
Restrained Beneficence
Perhaps the basic demands of beneficence, while important, are subject to certain reasonable restraints. Thomas Nagel, who is generally sympathetic to this idea, claims that even though "the bill for two in a moderately expensive New York restaurant equals the annual per capita income of Bangladesh" phenomenon is not unprecedented. Sen writes: "For example, in societies in which antifemale bias has flourished and been taken for granted, the understanding that this is not inevitable may itself require empirical knowledge as well as analytical arguments, and in many cases, this can be a laborious and challenging process." 4 The inability for certain societies to avoid such gender bias is analogous, in important respects, to the tendency for those in significantly richer circumstances to fixate on the moral legitimacy of long lasting and entrenched institutions that correspond to agent-relative prerogatives.
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Indeed, differing social circumstances may lead to different intuitions about the reasonable limits of basic beneficence. To test these limits, I will ask the reader to abstract from his or her social circumstances to consider the problem from alternative perspectives.
Specifically, I will look at the circumstances encountered in developing nations to consider whether or not, when faced with such states of affairs, our intuitions instruct us that the demands of basic beneficence are imperfect in the way that they are often thought to be in the context of, say, OECD nations.
Niger
The expectancy at birth and Gross National Income do not paint an entirely complete picture of the standard of living in Niger, they are accurate enough for our purposes. While the notion of a minimally decent standard of living is not entirely precise, a large number of Niger's 10.5 million people clearly are without adequate life expectancy. In addition, given Niger's startlingly low income and literacy rates, it is doubtful that a significant percentage of the population has basic needs met or has any meaningful choice in their life's activities. These statistics are striking enough for us to revisit our intuitions about the moral priority of agent-relative pursuits.
Suppose there were a citizen of Niger who, as a result of affluent ancestors (also Niger citizens), was able to garner substantial wealth. Surely, we would like to say, there is some duty for him to assist the persons who suffer from an indecent standard of living within the greater Niger citizenry-mutual citizenry, at least in this case, seems to establish a community of moral involvement within which people ought to take an interest in each other's conditions. 7 Given this assumption, however, would it be legitimate for him to purchase a moderately expensive dinner The social circumstances that allow one to contemplate resource allocation to even moderate indulgence are irrelevant, at least as far as our moral beliefs are concerned. 8 What is relevant from a moral point of view is the well-being of persons the rich ought to take a moral interest in-with whom they share a significant moral involvement. As Sen writes, "As people who live-in a broad sense-together, we cannot escape the thought that the terrible occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems." 9 The intuitive support for a Nagel-esque principle of restrained beneficence can thus be seen to wane: support also seems to exist for the suggestion that the problems faced by the wide Niger citizenry, with such a startling set of social statistics, ought to be the first allocative priority-their interests ought to outweigh the pursuit of agent-relative prerogatives.
The Moral Value of Agent-Relativity
The social situation in Niger seems to offer support for the idea that the initial intuitive response concerning the moral legitimacy of agent-relative prerogatives can be, in many cases, based on privilege. But some may deny the moral significance of this realization, offering the claim that agent-relative prerogatives may themselves hold independent moral value. If such is the case, a wealthy Nigérien might be legitimate in refusing to sacrifice what is of great moral importance. But this creates an additional difficulty: in order for such a claim to have plausibility, the moral value attached to agent-relative prerogatives must be of moral significance to all persons-not simply those who are in a position to realize their personal pursuits. Any claim that gives moral worth to agent-relative prerogatives seems, therefore, to necessitate the basic demands of beneficence: without the fulfillment one's most basic needs, agent-relative prerogatives are not sustainable. 10 At first blush, the position of the wealthy Niger citizen fails to take seriously the interests others may also have in fulfilling what is of moral importance, 7 Or so I will assume. If the reader is uncomfortable with the current example, he or she can substitute one that he or she believes to be a true moral community (while, of course, maintaining the relevant social structure of the current example; more will be said on this topic when dealing with the issue of scope Nevertheless, the pursuit of these institutions allows music and the arts to flourish in a way that many, especially those in a broadly neo-Aristotelian tradition, think ought to be the concern of moral theory. A community with concert halls and art museums, it might be said, can allow its members to live a better, more full, more excellent life. Those who would fund such institutions are, therefore, legitimate in doing so.
Once again, I maintain that such allocations would not be legitimate. As moral agents who understand that the problems faced by those who are without a minimally decent standard of living are "quintessentially our problems", we must also understand that we are required to place a priority on the minimally decent standard of living for those with whom we share the moral life (once again, the scope of moral obligation is discussed in the following section). How can it be justified for some to flourish while others are left to languish? When viewed in the light of tragic social circumstances, it is especially implausible to claim that the flourishing of the affluent has greater moral importance than the mere survival of those around them. Flourishing ought to be a worthwhile moral goal-but flourishing at any cost simply does not take seriously the interests of those who fall below a minimally decent standard of living.
Those who take agent-relative prerogatives to be of the utmost moral importance, There is good reason, however, for rejecting such a scope restriction even if one accepts a moral theory that employs the idea of sympathy. Hume himself goes to great pains to identify the means by which we sympathize with those outside our immediate community. 13 Other moral perspectives that are generally Humean in character have considered it important to correct the impression that a sympathy-based view might lead to a charge of parochialism. 14 This suggests that there is something crucial to our moral thinking in the idea of a (relatively) wide scope to moral obligation. While we may have obligations to our family and our local community, it would certainly be implausible to claim that those obligations capture the extent of our moral responsibilities. Moral community exists, I claim, where there is significant involvement between persons. It would be irresponsible to claim that such involvement is limited to those who would have no chance at failing to possess a minimally decent standard of living.
I have been assuming throughout that it is plausible to speak of a moral community within one's political scheme (for example, the moral community established by Niger citizenship). This, however, needn't be a rigid restriction. Wider moral communities can, and have, been established through the substantial and important interaction of its members, although I stop short of assuming wider communities to exist in all cases. A wider, perhaps global, scope is not required for the current enterprise; it is empirically plausible that any meaningful moral community has some persons without a minimally decent standard of living. Perhaps a more global scope is warranted-I will leave this question open. Assuming a global scope of obligation is not necessary to avoid the charge of triviality.
Obligations, Schizophrenia, and Safety Nets
If the central thesis of this paper is to be taken seriously, those who are in a position to contribute to the well-being of those who fall below a minimally decent standard of living are guilty of moral failure when they choose instead to allocate resources to agent-relative 13 Hume writes: "Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very reason it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render our sentiments more public and social," Enquiry Concerning to light yet another line of criticism that must be dealt with here. Critics often claim that strong moral demands can lead moral agents to a sort of, in the words of Michael Stocker, "moral schizophrenia," which results from moral obligations being radically detached from the agent's motives for action (such as when morality demands that an agent ignore his or her agent-relative prerogatives, for which he or she is motivated to act). 15 In a slightly stronger formulation, Bernard Williams has claimed that such a high level of obligation as that stipulated here may require agents to abandon projects or prerogatives that, for them, make life worth living. 16 In response to this line of criticism, and as a concluding note to this examination, I wish to say a few words about politics. It is an oft-noted 17 , but seldom-noticed, fact that the actual distribution of wealth and resources within a society can greatly influence the strength of moral obligations. That the basic demands would create psychological detachment is contingent upon there being persons without a minimally decent standard of living. Distributive justice schemes, however, can be arranged to provide a 'safety net' that provides for a decent living standard for persons within its purview. Critics who are concerned with "moral schizophrenia" are therefore urged to battle, not against moral demands that are required for any moral theory that takes seriously the interests of others, but against social structures that allow basic demands to become overwhelmingly strong. 
